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1. INTRODUCTION
As a concept social security bas its roots in western society. In contempo-
rary western societies it is common to indicate with social security thé
protection provided by (mainly) state institutions for individuals or social
groups against the loss of earnings, which resuit from so called social risks
(for example, old âge, sickness, maternity, unemployment). Four major
éléments of tfais protection are income-tested social assistance, social
insurance, categorical transfers, and health care (Atkinson 1988:100-123).
Studies of social security in western societies focus on thé implementation
of thèse forms of protection, and their effects on socio-économie proces-
ses and relationships.
By interpreting thé concept social security as described above, one could
easily suggest that social security is a particular feature of the western
society only. A study of, for example, social security in a developing
country, would reveal that almost no social security exist in thé sensé
described above. Anthropological studies, however, have made clear that
also in non-western societies mechanisms exist to protect individuals or
social groups against social risks. However, with our narrow interprétation
of social security we would not label thèse mechanisms as social security.
In order to make thé study of social security in developing countries
possible, we hâve to adapt our ideas on what social security exactly is and
to change our analytical framework accordingly. The analytical framework
bas to be less spécifie, i.e., less oriented on western societies.
This paper discusses thé concept of social security itself and important
related issues. In Section 2 thé définition problem of social security is
discussed. A less western oriented définition is presented, which might
facilitate thé study of social security in developing countries. Section 3
justifies this wider définition by arguing that social security can be consi-
dered as a universal necessity, and as a phenomenon is not restricted to
western societies. Section 4 discusses important related issues like "forms"
and "principles" of social security, methods underlying social security
Systems and thé main déterminants of social security Systems.
It is not the objective of this paper to present the définition of social
security or thé theory of social security. The main objective is to discuss
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and place the concept of social security and related issues in a more
genera! context, which would facilitate, then, the analysis of social security
in developing countries.
2. THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The term "social security" has its origin in the welfare policy of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930's. In 1934 Roosevelt announced a
program for "security against the hazards and vicissitudes tof life"upartsch
1985:14). In 1935 this announcement was followed by the "Social Security
Act".1 In 1948 social security was officially proclaimed a human right in
Article 22 of the General Déclaration of Human Rights of the^United
Nations. In 1952 the International Labour Office (ILO) introduced an
ultimate définition of social security in Convention 102. Nowadays social
security is a major component of welfare policies of all industrialized
countries.
Studies on social security in developing countries (e.g., Fuchs 1983; Mesa-
Lago 1978; Mouton 1975) have frequently used the ILO définition of
social security. But it became clear that this définition has some limita-
tions when it is applied to the analysis of social security in developing
countries. Nevertheless, the ILO définition will be the point of departure
in Section 2.1., in which the ILO définition and its shortcomings with
respect to developing countries are analyzed. Section 2.2. discusses the
formulation of an alternative définition, which is thought to be «more
useful when analyzing social security in developing countries. ù
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 The title of the Social Security Act gives an indication of what was
already understood under social security: "An Act to provide for the
genera! welfare by establishing a system of fédéral old âge benefits, and
by enabling the several states to make more adequate provision for aged
persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternai and
child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment
compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise "revenue;
and for other purposes" (quotation from Partsch 1983:15, footnote 10).
2.1. The ILO définition of social security
In 1952 the International Labour Office defined in Convention 102 social
security as:
"the protection which society provides for its members, through a
series of public measures, against the economie and social distress
that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial
réduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment
injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of
médical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with
children." (ELO 1984:2-3)
This définition has been used during the last decades by both policy
makers and researchers dealing with social security in western societies.
The last decade an increasing amount of studies of social security in
developing countries is published. Not only social security Systems based
on western models were studied, but also other forms and mechanisms got
increasing attention.
With this studies became clear that the ILO définition was too limited to
analyze non-western social security Systems. Let us therefore discuss the
major points from the BLO définition and relate these points to develop-
ing countries in order to highlight the main deficiënties of the définition.
The ILO définition states that social security is a form of protection
provided by "society... through... public measures". In literature on social
security sometimes is argued (Woodman 1988), that this part of the
définition might draw the attention to state institutions of social security
only. In studies on social security "society" is often understood as "state"
and in accordance with this "public measures" are synonymous to state
laws. Woodman (1988:70) argues that this limitation reflects the tendency
for politica! discussion in western societies to exalt the state. By interpret-
ing social security as a form of protection by the state or state-mitiated
organisations, several studies on social security in developing countries
(e.g., Fuchs 1985; Mesa-Lago 1978; Mouton 1975) suggest that social
security is a scarce good to find in those societies. Fuchs (1985:35-7)
estimâtes that 10 percent or less of the population in developing countries
is covered by social security provided by the state. By giving such a
limited interprétation of "society" and "public measures" in the ELO défini-
tion a whole range of mechanisms and forms of social security functioning
at other levels (household, family, community, etc.) are overlooked. Most
people in developing countries obtain their social security at these other
levels.
Although some studies suggest that the ILO définition itself attracts atten-
tion to state-organized forms of social security we think this is rather an
interprétation of the authors themselves. The référence in the ILO
définition to society and public measures is not a deficiency. "Society" can
easily be understood as a constellation of families, kingroups, clans,
villages, and a state; and although "public" in economie analysis is part of
the public-private dichotomy in which "public" often stands for state
organized or state initialized, "public" can also be interpreted as "public
action" (see, for example, Drèze and Sen 1991), which can be found at all
levels of society. Until sofar the définition of the ILO does not seem to
limit the study of social security in developing countries.
The ILO définition continues with the statement that social ,secprity
protects against social and economie distress. What is Mistress'1!?« In
industrialized countries it mostly indicates the exceptional situation of
being in danger of falling below an acceptable and normal minimum level
of social and economie well-being. The measure of this level is relative to
the Standard achievable by many in society. In developing countries
 s this
level is usually very low, and "distress" must be understooalihen as
"destitution", i.e., a condition below the standard necessary for survival as
a member of society (Woodman 1988:70). The point made here, is that
social and economie distress may have a different meaning in déveloped
and developing countries. We will return to the valuation of
 ;disteess in
Section 2.2. * J t
, i>tf
The ILO définition also indicates that the major cause of sqdalr;and
''' t *
economie distress is the loss of earnings as result of a core group^f risks.
we look at the loss of earnings two points can be made. At first sight
eàrnàigs can be understood as monetary earnings. However, in developing
countries f ar more people are dependent on activities which generate
aon-monetary earnings. All forms of income-producing activity are
in issue. It would be désirable to make this clearer in the defini-
Secondly, social security only seems to apply to persons who suffer
social and economie distress as result of losing earnings. It does not meet
case of a person who loses an "unearned" income, that is, an income
attributable to a continuing economie activity on their part. The
Definition ought to meet not only the cases of those who lose an income-
^producing activity, but also of those who are unable to begin any (Wood-
1988:72). In these respects the ILO définition is elearly related to a
socio-economic order, i.e., that order that is assumed to make
lljpvision for most members of society. In developing countries the
ïsting social orders vary and are changing rapidly. Any référence to loss
lack of earnings might be better avoided, then.
IWjth respect to the causes of loss of earnings the ILO définition refers to
group of risks. Certainly these risks can be found in all countries,
for developing countries other risks are equally important. Because of
ological innovation and progress industrialized countries have largely
able to eliminate weather-induced and environmental risks, like
drought, érosion, floods, etc. However, for people in developing countries
risks are a persistent danger for their earnings. It can be discussed if
kind of risks should not be included when looking at developing
It might even be better to avoid any référence to any risk, as
might differ with each society studied. We will also turn to this point
Section 2.2.
A last remark is conceraed with the last two phrases of the ILO défini-
t - ^
the provision of médical care and subsidies for families with
. Both seem to be in contradiction with the former phrases. In the
part of the définition protection only seems to apply to those who
* earnings, while the second part seems to apply to all people. Both the
on of médical care and of child maintenance are not limited to
families which are themselves at risk. Here the objective is different from
the protection against distress. It is a social objective in which the ILO
gestures towards the goal of equalisation of material conditions.
In sum it can be concluded on the one hand that the ULO définition
contains éléments that are broad enough to cover the prevailing situation
in developing countries. It is rather the interprétation of concepts like
"society", "public", and "distress" by western scholars that restrict studies
than the terms themselves, which can be considered broad enough.,On the
other hand the second part of the définition, which refers to iloss of
earnings, a core group of risks and the provision of médical and child
care, contains some biased, and in the latter cases, some contradictory
éléments and reflect a particular socio-economic order. These underlying
assumptions restrict the analysis of social security in developing countries,
where other, sometimes rapidly changing, socio-economic orders are to be
found, with different uncertainties and different priorities.
A more genera! définition is needed, therefore, when studying social
security in developing countries. This is discussed in the following section.
22. An alternative définition of social security
When studying social security in developing countries it is*not so difficult
to indicate thé weak points of thé ILO définition of social security.^It is,
however, far more difficult to find a good alternative which reflects both
thé situation in developing countries and at the same timehis restrictive
enough to define social security as a research object. ' mt<®> * * *
From thé previous section thé conclusion may be drawiMthatithe défini-
tion of social security in developing countries should be dissoeiated from
any spécifie type of normative régulation or transfer of goods and services
Von Benda-Beckmann (1988:10) suggests that we must use the4erm social
security to indicate, perhaps illuminate, a field of social cprobiems, rather
than looking for clear boundaries of thé concept. With sociali problems
Von Benda-Beckmann means that people in developing countries suffer
from insecurity, from uncertainties: whether or not they wi^have^ enough
to eat tomorrow, hâve a roof above their head, be cared for when they
are ill, etc. In the most général sensé, then, social security refers to "thé
efforts of individuals, kingroups, villages and state institutions to overcome
thèse insecurities" (Von Benda-Beckmann 1988:10).
According to Von Benda-Beckmann (1988:10) the term social security can
thus be taken to refer to social phenomena on a variety of levels. On one
level it indicates values, ideals, idéologies, and, in more concrète form,
policy objectives. Différent agents define social security differently. It does
not make sensé to take one such définition. One should rather investigate
thé différent définitions and relate them to thé problem of social security.
The second level is thé level of institutions. Also hère we encounter gréât
variety. In some societies (industrialized countries), spécifie institutions
have been build to provide assistance to thé needy, in other societies no
spécifie social security institutions have been differentiated from social
organisation in général. We hâve to analyze thèse différences, explain
them and indicate their significance. And at the third level, at the level of
practical collective and individual action, social security colours the most
varied sorts of social processes. Building a house, as category of behav-
iour, is not as such a form of social security provision, but building houses
for thé poor might be considered as such.
The définition of Von Benda-Beckmann is wide but allows to distinguish
more sharply thé unknown areas and conceptualizations needed (Von
Benda-Beckmann 1988:11). However, it is argued hère that thé définition
is too wide to be of practical use when doing research on social security in
developing countries. The danger might arise, because of very low stan-
dards of living in developing countries, that ail institutions and mechan-
isms (differentiated or not from social organisation), that ail collective
and individual action, can be interpreted as social security. In this sensé,
then, a study on social security leads to a study of society in ail its facets
and cannot be considered as a separate research object any more.
In bis theoretical study on pre-industrialized societies Partsch (1983:47)
suggests that a définition of social security should stress the function of
social security for individual and society. Although Partsch's study refers
to western pre-industrialized societies (what he calls archaic and feudal
societies), bis study gives a contribution that is important for the study of
developing countries also, without adopting an evolutionistic approach.
Like most scholars Partsch rejects thé définition of social security that
refers to spécifie institutions or particular forms of action and risks as
thèse are highly dépendent on the society studied. Such a définition
cannot be used to study social security in diffèrent societies and to
compare différent societies.
Partsch argues that thé fonction of social security can be iderived Jffom thé
term "social security" itself. The function of social security hasiapparently
something to do with an 'ïnsurance function". What -is^thè ©bjeet of
insurance, then? The answer is "thé standard of livmg'VofiindirâduÉlsS or
social groups. The concept of standard of livmg itself is a con^opersial
one. If the object of insurance is the standard of living, then thé (standard
of living must be operationalized or better still "valued". AÏ thesis can be
written on this subject. We have different priorities hère, but will pay
brief attention to this valuation problem.
Dreze and Sen (1991:5-10) distinguish three valuation methods of Stan-
dard of living. The first approach is the utilitarian notion of value, derived
from mainstream welfare économies. It sees value only in individual
Utility, itself defined in terms of some mental condition, such äs pleasure,
happiness, desire-fulfilment. This subjectivist perspective is, however, very
misleading äs it may fail to reflects a person's real deprivation. For
example, in times of long-standing deprivation a person is not going to
sigh all day and complain about bis or her miserable situation. He or she
will try to find pleasure in some small mercies. When a metric is used,
then, like pleasure, someone's real deprivation may be eoncealed.
The second approach concentrâtes on a person's real income or command
over essential commodities. An example within this approach is the "basic
needs approach", which concentrâtes on thé requirement to provide some
specified minimal amounts of necessary goods (such asi ÄDlglSiölMng,j. tf t*? ^ • **i'
shelter, etc). The disadvantage of this approach is that itteia-bJUty to
convert commodities into personal achievements may vàryigEeallyïbetween
one person and another, and also between commumties.^ftelusingr on
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incomes for analyzing poverty and deprivation has the same problem of
variability, because the value of income lies in its use for commanding
commodities (Drèze and Sen 1991:6). Moreover, there is an additional
problem of variability in the relationship between income and commod-
ities. Market limitations can cause variations in the power of income to
establish command over goods and services (Drèze and Sen 1991:6).
Therefore the problem of conversion of commodities into living standards
is compounded by the problem of conversion of income into commodities.
The third approach comes from Drèze and Sen themselves and they
propose that the focus variable for analyzing quality of life in genera! or
deprivation and poverty in particular, is the capability to perforai certain
basic fonctions. If life is seen as a set of doings and beings that are valu-
able, the exercise of assessing the quality of life takes the form of evaluat-
ing these fonctionings and the capability to fonction. The task is that of
évaluation of the importance of the various fonctionings in human life.
The functionings have to be examined, and the capability of the person to
achieve them has to be appropriately valued (Drèze and Sen 1991:8).
Drèze and Sen (1991:9) conclude that the ultimate analysis of quality of
life in genera! or poverty in particular has to be with the deprivation of
living conditions, for example, lack of nourishment (rather than of the
income to buy nutrients), exposure to preventable diseases (rather than
inability to buy medicine), and so on. Poverty or deprivation is the failure
to have the ability to achieve minimal levels of certain basic fonctionings
(such äs being adequately^nourished, minimally sheltered, and so on), and
that failure would have to occupy the centre of the stage (Drèze and Sen
1991:9).
Returning now to our discussion of the fonction of social security, we can
say that the security fonction of social security with respect to the stan-
dard of living might be twofold: the first one is to prevent détérioration of
the standard of living, i.e., the protection of an individual against a
decrease in his or her abilities to achieve minimal levels of certain basic
fonctionings. Moreover, a fonction of social security might be to increase
someone's standard of living, if a person's Standard of living is below a
certain minimum standard of living. In other words, social security can
also have the fonction to increase someone's abilities to achieve certain
basic fonctionings.
In the literature (Burgess and Stern 1991; Drèze and Sen 1991; Atkinson
1989; Partsch 1983) this double fonction of social security with regard to
the Standard of living is emphasized. It is important to distinguish these
two fonctions, which can be labelled as "protection" and "promotion"
(Drèze and Sen 1991:3). The protection fonction is concerned with
preventing a décline in living standards in genera! and in the basic
conditions of living in particular. This contrasts with the fonction of
enhancing normal living conditions and dealing with regulär and often
persistent deprivation. This promotional aspect of social security.is more
ambitious in wanting to counter problems that have survived for thou-
sands of years. The implication of this twofold fonction is important for
strategie issues.
When we read the ILO définition of social security carefolly the protec-
tion and promotion fonction can be found. The protection element can be
found in the part of the définition where social and economie distress
(i.e., fall of standard of living) has to be avoided. A fall of a standard of
living (décline of capabilities to achieve certain basic fonctions) can occur
by events like sickness, invalidity, unemployment, employment injury,
sudden death of household mernber, and old age. The promotion ^element
can be found in the provision of médical care and subsidies for tfamilies
with children. This is promotion of the existing standard of »living as the
capabilities of family members to achieve certain basic fonctionings are
extended. *
When millions of people live in a continuing situation of sévère depriva-
tion, i.e., a situation in which they do not have capabilities to achieve
certain basic fonctionings, the promotional fonction of social security
seems to be more important than the protection fonction, although the
latter is not absent in situations of sévère deprivation. Even whe» living in
deprivation there might be some social security to prevent a situation in
which people fall further and forther as result of particular contingencies.
When we speak of social security we have both protective and promo-
tional social security in mind.
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1^y-K we would stop our discussion of the définition of social security, the
f'ï; èeêmûôm would be as follows: social security is the protection against a
fcwfell in the standard of living of individuals or social groups and/or the
^promotion of those standards of living of individuals and social groups,
which aresbelow a certain minimum level.
:
'ïtn& définition only highlights that social security "insures" the standard of
Hving by protection and promotion. The protection and promotion of
can be reached, however, by all kinds of measures and
but also by général developments like climatic change and
^eononiiCAdevelopment. Moreover. also the individual him- or herself is
söffietimeSiable to protect or promote his or her own standard of living. Is
tbis; included then in the social security agenda? This is a rethoric
lestions? .-.
givinglta meaning to "social" in the term "social security" and incorpor-
ttg tM& meaning in the définition we might be able to limit the "actions"
2fhät falnmder the umbrella of social security.
;^ ö<äaFMs a term with a lot of meanings. It is common use to indicate
! isàth 1ls@cial" an act or mentality that is directed to the well-being of one's
;'>ie1(QW*i%n. According to Partsch (1983:49) the term "social" in social
^ÄvSeatfity^originally may have had such a meaning. Social policy, of which
Security is a part, originales from criticisms on the miserable
Ütions in which the industrial prolétariat had to live during the last
(Partsch 1983:49). It is not very realistic to assume that this kind
beblviour is still meant with "social" when speaking about "social
üfef*
mire likely that the meaning of social is in essence "societal" or "by
C As we saw in Section 2.1. the ILO also interpreted "social" to< ~ - ~ ,
&esßL %y society"... "through a series of public measures". It was indicated
Äat tenns like "society" and "public measures" are often interpreted äs
»s^e« |^ ^ "measures by the state" respectively. Analogous to the ILO we
^"
f
Äso inéicate with "social" "by society", but hère the term "society" is not
^'" "4^K)Hed«i,to refer to state institutions only. We prefer to use the term in a/ ^  * •/ x.
.touch Broader sensé, indicating a constellation of families, kingroups,
villages, and a state. Apart from this, we think that a social security
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définition for developing countries should not mention références to
public or any other spécifie measures. Although spécifie social security
measures do exist in developing countries, most people dépend for their
social security on social processes or institutions that cannot be differenti-
ated from social organization in général and, therefore, thèse processes
and institutions cannot be labelled as explicit "social security measures".
The implicit contribution, however, of thèse processes and institutions to
thé double fonction of social security (thé protection and promotion of
thé standards of living of individuals or social groups) should make them
part of social security analysis in developing countries. Therefore, it seems
better to avoid any référence to spécifie measures in a social security
définition for developing countries.
In sum, we give the term "social" a broader meaning than the ILO did,
but still our interprétation is somehow restrictive. First of ail, it excludes
measures at thé individual level from being included in thé analysis of
social security. An individual might well be able to prevent him-^or herself
against a fall of thé standard of living by taking his or her own measures.
By referring to society, measures at the individual level are excluded and
do not fall under social security. Secondly, thé restriction to society
excludes a wide range of other factors (for example, technological innova-
tions, industrialization), which may contribute to thé objective of social
security, but cannot be considered as part of a social security agenda
(Burgess and Stern 1991:43).
Finally, it can be asked if a définition of social security should refer to
spécifie contingencies. Previous critics indicate that thé incorporation in
thé définition of specifïed contingencies is not désirable. The multitude of
contingencies that are prévalent in developing countries will make it
impossible to mention them ail in a définition of social security. In fact ail
contingencies are under issue, as far as thé contingency influences someo-
ne's standard of living negatively and thé individual is not able to cope
with thé conséquences of a particular contingency him- or herself. It is
proposed hère to summarize contingencies under thé head of "temporary
adversities", which is considered broad enough to cover all kinds of
contingencies. Moreover, in developing countries millions of people have
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a very low standard of living as resuit of persistent deprivation. This
standard of living is far below an acceptable minimum standard of living
and is mostly not the resuit of temporary adversities, but a conséquence of
long standing deprivation.
Ail what is said in this section leads to a définition of social security that
we want to présent hère:
"social security is, firstly, thé protection by society of individuals or
social groups against a fall in their standards of living as resuit of
temporary adversities and, secondly, thé promotion by society of
those standards of living of individuals or social groups which are
below an acceptable minimum level".
The définition presented should not be considered as thé one and only
définition of social security. But when studying social security in develo-
ping countries this définition bas some advantages over the ILO défini-
tion. Firstly, our définition stresses more clearly thé double function of
social security, i.e., thé protection and thé promotion of standards of
living. Especially when studying developing countries with millions of
people living below a subsistence minimum, this distinction can be import-
ant. Secondly, thé définition does not mention a spécifie core of contin-
gencies. The occurrence of contingencies and their frequencies and
impacts differ per society. »Moreover, in each society views differ on what
kind of contingencies should be covered by a social security program.
Thirdly, thé définition attaches less weight to the state as thé sole pro-
vider of social security. In our view many institutions and social processes
in society contribute implicitly or explicitly to thé ultimate goal of social
security and these can be found at all levels of society.
In sum, in our opinion thé presented définition is less oriented towards a
spécifie socio-économie order. When applying this définition of social
security it will be casier to analyze social security in developing countries.
Of course, we acknowledge that définitions of social security contain many
subjective éléments and thé remarks of Von Benda-Beckmann should be
borne in mind. Différent agents within a given society will define social
13
security differently according to their own position in society. What
ultimately in a given society is considered as social security or which
contingencies should be covered by a social security program is mostly the
outcome of a politica! process. The rôle of pressure groups, public action
and political processes should, therefore, not be underestimated when
studying social security in a given society (Drèze and Sen 1991; Mesa-
Lago 1978).
3. SOCIAL SECURITY AS UNIVERSAL NECESSITY
In Section 2 we concentrated on the définition problern of social security.
We argued that most définitions used by scholars refiect the situation in
industrialized countries. Our définition is meant to be much broader and
can be applied on developing countries too. However, by defining social
security within a broader context, we assumed implicitiy that social
security can be found in all kind of societies. Recent studies (Ahmad et
al. 1991; Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988; Bossert 1985; Partsch 1983) show
that also in non-industrialized societies forms of social security exist, often
different from those in the industrialized societies.2 With Partsch (1983:-
54) we want to argue that social security can be found all over the world,
because it is an universal necessity. It remains, however, difficult to prove
this assumption inductively, because it is impossible to study all societies
at all times. Moreover, one deviating case would force us to reject the
assumption immediately.
To make the assumption plausible Partsch (1983:54) suggests to follow the
deductive route by formulating conditions that require the existence of
some form of social security. If empirical research confirms these condi-
tions with an acceptable certainty, the universal necessity of social
security can be derived from the ubiquitous existence of these conditions.
Social security can be seen as an universal necessity if, firstly, all over the
world, at all times, the standard of living of people is threatened by risks
2
 What exactly is understood in this paper with "forms of social secur-
ity" is explained in the next section.
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or uncertainties, and secondly, all over the world, at all times, the possibil-
ities of people to protect themselves individually against thé conséquences
of an actual occurrence of a risk or uncertainty are insufficient.
For thé fîrst condition for social security to be an universal necessity, thé
universal vulnerability of people for risks, Partsch (1983:55-7) uses insights
from "philosophical anthropology" to underpin this condition. In this view
man is considered as a being of nature which is relatively vulnérable in
comparison with other beings (like animais, plants, etc.). The human
being bas less specialized organs than other beings and lack of protective
institutions would make man relatively vulnérable then. Without any
artificial means of help man would not have existed for a long time. But,
as philosophical anthropology argues, because people were able to make
instruments and tools to replace missing organs (technological progress)
and because of thé building of social and organizational institutions
(social progress) thé human being was able to change the natural environ-
ment into an artificial environment (culture) in which man is less vulnér-
able and consequently viable. Notwithstanding this technological and
social progress, mankind is still threatened by risks like sickness, death,
etc.. History shows that mankind has not been able to eliminate all risks
from its environment.
However, the universal threat of risks does not necessitate social security.
It is the inadequacy of individual précautions that do necessitate social
security. People are not able to bear all conséquences of risks that
endanger their standard of living themselves. The validity of this condition
can be proved when we ask ourselves what the conditions are that would
enable a human being to protect him- or herself fully against risks. These
conditions are threefold.
Firstly, an individual must have command over commodities that hè or
she does not need for subsistence needs; this requires the production of a
surplus. Secondly, an individual must have free command over this
surplus, i.e., an individual is not forced to give the surplus to others (by
tax levies, etc.), there are no traditions or norms that restrict the use of
the surplus, and the use of the surplus does not require the permission of
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others. Thirdly, the means over which can be freely commanded must not
lose their value or utility in time and must be at a person's disposai
immediately.
Besides, even when thèse conditions are fulfîlled, thé possibilités of
individual précautions are limited by thé fact that from an individual
perspective it is not always possible to foresee if a risk actually will occur
(for example, ilhiess, accident), when it will occur (for example, death of
family member) and how long thé conséquences of a risk occurrence will
last. Only complete absence of uncertainty would remove these con-
straints. However, according to a common insurance principle, hundred
percent certainty never exists. In order to make individual précautions
sufficient to meet the conséquences of the risk occurrence, then, thèse
précautions should be based on thé maximal possible harm that can occur,
and not on a mean possibility. The higher the uncertainty about the risk
occurrence, thé moment of occurrence and the duration of the consé-
quences, thé less appropriate and limited are individual précautions.
It is obvious that thé fore mentioned conditions to make individual
précautions sufficient in case of risk occurrence are not fulfilled in real
life. This implies that an individual cannot protect himself against ail risks
individually, and that it might also not be economically efficient for an
individual to do so.
In summary, thé universal existence of risks threatening mankind, and the
insufficiency of individual précautions to meet the conséquences of thèse
risks, seem to make social security an universal necessity. By answering
thé question why social security can be considered as an universal necess-
ity, we hâve justifîed thé choice for a much broader définition of social
security as presented in Section 2.
The universal necessity of social security does not automatically imply,
however, that social security is considered as désirable in any given society
and that forms are developed that meet the objectives of social security.
In other words, nothing is said thus far on thé question whether or not it
is possible in a given society tô develop institutions, mechanisms, pro-
cesses, that meet the objectives of social security. Several conditions hâve
to be fulfilled to make this possible, and thé actual forms of social
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security are influencée! by several déterminants. Thèse conditions *, and
déterminants will be subject of discussion in thé next section.
4. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: METHODS, FORMS AND DETER-
MINANTS
In previous sections we were concerned with thé définition of social
security and indicating its universal necessity. Defining social security and
stating its universal necessity is one thing; thé realization of social security
is another one. The efforts that are taken to realize thé objectives of
social security can be referred to as "social security System". With Frei-
burg-Strauss and Jung (1988:229-230) we will use the term "social security
System" to refer to ail measures and stratégies by society that, in their
entirety, contribute to thé objectives of social security, i.e., thé protection
of individuals or social groups against a fall in their standard of living as
resuit of temporary adversity and amélioration of low standards of living
of individuals and social groups resulting from long-standing deprivation.
It should be clear that social security Systems differ considerably between
societies. It is therefore almost impossible to analyze social security
Systems without referring to a particular society. The aim of this section is
to discuss thé basic éléments of social security Systems.
The theoretical points made in this section are mainly derived from
Partsch (1983), which is one of the few studies that intends to develop a
theoretical framework to analyze social security Systems in non-industrial-
ized societies. Methods of redistribution underlying social security Systems
will be discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2. will deal with principles and
forms of social security Systems, while Section 4.3. will briefly indicate thé
main déterminants of social security Systems.
4.1. Methods of redistribution and social security Systems
The inadequacy of individual précautions against contingencies (see
Section 3) does not mean that social précautions are automatically there.
Both thé émergence and existence of social précautions, i.e., a social
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security System, depend on several conditions. We can find such condi-
tions when we look at the theoretical possibilities of realizing the objec-
tives of social security.
Essentially there are only two possibilities to protect an individual against
a contingency. Firstly, by trying to avoid a risk occurrence and secondly,
by eliminating or easing thé conséquences of a risk. We have already seen
in Section 3 that thé élimination of a risk occurrence is difficult to attain.
In industrialized countries fast technological and médical progress suc-
ceeded in reducing thé occurrence of mostiy weather-induced risks and
médical risks (épidémies, for example). Nevertheless, industrialized
countries did not succeed in eliminating all kind of contingenties. For
developing countries, with lower levels of technological and médical
development, thé élimination of risks occurrences is even more difficult
and is therefore not a likely solution for thé protection of an individual. In
both developed and developing countries, therefore, we dépend on thé
élimination or easing of thé conséquences of a contingency by individual
and social précautions. As we are concerned hère with social précautions
only, thé question is how thèse social précautions can be realized.
In Section 2 we argued that risk occurrences often hâve conséquences for
an individual's standard of living. These conséquences of a contingency for
someone's standard of living (i.e., ability to achieve minimum levels of
certain basic functionings) are mostly negative and also feit as such by the
person in question. A récupération of thé initial standard of living
requires, economically speaking, means (goods, services or money).3 Cru-
3
 It is not stated hère that thé use of means is always sufficient to
recuperate an individual's standard of living. Drèze and Sen (1991:9), for
example, indicate in thé case of poverty relief that poverty is often
understood by policy makers as a problem of income shortage. Promoting
higher incomes is considered, then, as thé solution for poverty. But other
reasons than shortage of income might cause poverty, for example,
unequal distribution of income within households, gender position, etc.
The same argument can be applied on our discussion. The use of means
like goods, services and money do not always guarantee thé récupération
of thé initial standards of living of individuals, although its necessity
cannot be denied.
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cial is hère that it concerns an extra need, a need that was
before a formerly uncertain event really happened. Given the universal
scarcity of income, goods and services on the one hand and unlltnitea
consumer needs on the other hand, this extra need can only be satisfied
by abstaining from the satisfaction of other needs (Partsch 1983:60).
Resources, originally planned for satisfaction of certain needs, must be
directed to the fulfilment of certain other needs that were not there
before. In order to let this process take place a redistribution of available
means is required. Means have to be redistributed among needs to be
satisfied and among individuals.
Partsch (1983:60) distinguishes three modes of redistribution: intertem-
poral, interregional, and interpersonal redistribution. With intertemporal
redistribution is meant redistribution by using means that were accumu-
lated in the past (reserves) or means that are obtained by taking an
advance on future means (borrowing). Interrégional redistribution takes
places when a surplus of means (i.e., excess above certain defined mini-
mum level of means available) in one région is transferred to a déficit
région. With interpersonal redistribution part of available means belong-
ing to a person not affected by a risk is transferred to those who were
affected.
Thèse général modes of redistribution can also be used as instruments for
a social security System to solve its problem (how to fulfil an additional
need for means as resuit of a contingency). Whether or not social security
Systems can be based on one or more of thèse modes of redistribution
dépends on thé extent to which conditions are fulfilled to let a particular
mode of redistribution fonction. Let us hâve a closer look at thèse
conditions, then.
Intertemporal redistribution
Intertemporal redistribution requires in thé first place that production and
consumption of means do not take place in thé same period. This require-
ment leads to thé conclusion that it must be possible to store means in
order to make intertemporal redistribution possible. If we distinguish
between goods, services and money we can easily see that thé possibility
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of storing means diffère according to the kind of means we are talking
about.
When looking at developing countries one of the goods most produced
and consumed is food. However, especially in rural areas, it is extremely
difficult to store food and related products. Low level of technological
development and lack of storage facilities hamper the possibility of inter-
temporal redistribution of these goods. In many developing countries
keeping cattle is a common practice and can be an example of storing
durable food. However, besides being consumer good, cattle is also often
used as production input. Therefore, the use of cattle in times of extra
consumption needs is limited, because otherwise future subsistence could
be highly endangered. Services, as another form of means, are not suitable
for intertemporal redistribution simply because the production (delivery)
of services cannot be separated in time from its consumption. Money, the
third means, has facilitated intertemporal redistribution. For an individual
or a household, for instance, thé moment of generating an income and
consuming it can be easily separated by saving or investing in durable
items. Money is also easy to take an advance on. But in most developing
countries, especially in thé rural areas, financial institutions and markets
are not well developed, which hampers the possibility of redistributing
money in time. Much literature can be found on this subject (see, for
example, Adams et al. 1984, Von Pischke et al. 1983). We will not go into
detail hère. The point made hère is that the existence money créâtes
more opportunities for intertemporal redistribution to be an instrument
for social security Systems. However, thé administrative and organizational
skills that are required then are very high and most developing countries
are unable to fulfil thèse requirements. This makes that intertemporal
redistribution is less likely to be found as instrument of social security
Systems in developing countries.
Interrégional redistribution
Interrégional redistribution involves thé movement of means from a
région with a surplus of means to a région with a déficit. Two important
prerequisites for interrégional redistribution to take place are a good
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transport System and a good communication network. The a*
System is of course necessary to transport surpluses to thé .'de
communication networks are necessary in order to identify quickly surplus
and déficit areas, and to let the necessary means arrive in time. Drèze
and Sen (1991), for example, stress thé importance of an early warning
System in case of régional food shortages, which could highly reduce thé
damage caused by such regional shortages. In many developing countries
a good transport and communication System is absent. It is therefore not
likely that régional redistribution can be a appropriate method of social
security Systems.4
Interpersonal redistribution
One of the features of interpersonal redistribution is that it requires to a
much lesser extent thé conditions, necessary for redistribution in time or
space. This makes interpersonal redistribution, as method of social
security Systems, more appropriate in developing countries than intertem-
poral and interrégional redistribution. One should expect, then, in most
developing countries social security Systems based on interpersonal
redistribution as thé main method for thé requisite redistribution of
means. It is not stated hère that interpersonal redistribution is automati-
cally thé method if thé conditions for intertemporal and interrégional
redistribution are not fulfilled. But, as we will see in this section, in
developing countries thé conditions for interpersonal redistribution to be
a method of redistribution are casier to accomplish than for intertemporal
and interrégional redistribution. This might lead to the hypothesis that
technologically and economically less developed societies will have social
security Systems mainly based on thé method of interpersonal redistribu-
tion.
One of thé first économie conditions for interpersonal redistribution to be
a feasible instrument for thé distribution of means within social security
4
 This statement refers to régional redistribution within a country or
society. At international level régional redistribution is often used as
method for social security Systems, for example in thé case of emergency
help between industrialized and developing countries.
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Systems is that the production and the consumption of means are separate
processes at the individual level (Partsch 1983:63). This implies that some
kind of division of labour must exist. Although the degree of division of
labour in developing countries is lower than in the industrialized market
économies, some division of labour exists, mostly according to sex and
age.
Another important economie condition for interpersonal redistribution to
take place is the ratio producers yersus non-producers. Each society
consists of a number of producers and non-producers (among others,
mostly children and elderly). The survival of the non-producers dépends
heavily on the number of producers that can produce more means of
subsistence than necessary for their own consumption. To guarantee each
member of society an acceptable standard of living, then, the ratio
producers to non-producers cannot be too low. Economie development,
attended with a productivity rise, allows a higher number of non-pro-
ducers and consequently a lower ratio.
The importance of the ratio producers/non-producers can be shown when
we look at what happens when (as result of a contingency) the number of
non-producers rises. If the objective is to maintain the standard of living
of non-producers the standard of living of producers will fall (unless the
labour productivity is increased), because of a higher bürden for each
producer. The argument goes the other way around if the objective is to
maintain the standard of living of the producers: the non-producers will
suffer then. A good example of the importance of this ratio is the increas-
ing concern in industrialized countries with the ageing population, causing
a situation in which a decreasing number of producers have to carry the
bürden for an increasing number of non-producers. It should be clear that
depending on the level of economie development, a minimum value of the
ratio producers/non-producers is necessary to guarantee an acceptable
minimum standard of living for each member of society.
The existence of division of labour and a minimum amount of producers
compared to non-producers are two important economie conditions for
interpersonal redistribution. However, because interpersonal redistribution
involves the transfer of means from one individual to another, Partsch
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(1983:64) states that also socio-structural, institutionali«alidflhoraiative
conditions have to be fulfilled to make interpersonal redistribution „an
appropriate method for social security Systems. This requires -alfhoie
detailed analysis of interpersonal redistribution as method for social
security Systems.
Within social security Systems interpersonal redistribution can be an
instrument to balance risks and needs within human groups or societies.
The question can be asked, then, under what conditions this balancing will
take place, as we cannot assume that in each spontaneously formed
human group such a balancing will take place.
Zacher (1979) labels a group that reaches social security by interpersonal
redistribution as a solidarity group or risk-group. This group can be
formed when individuals are confronted with thé threat of one or more
common contingencies and the members want to take common précau-
tions against this threat. The extent to which a risk and need balancing in
a solidarity group takes place dépends on four factors, then: the size of
thé group, thé composition of thé group, thé durability of the group, and
thé principle of redistribution within thé group.
The size of thé group is important because it détermines thé bürden that
will fall on each single member when one or more group member(s)
fall(s) short of particular needs. The more members thé group bas, thé
lesser will be thé bürden for each single member when one of them falls
short. A minimum size for a solidarity or risk group would be difficult to
estimate, but it can be suggested that the size must exceed those of a
nuclear family (husband, wife and children) (Partsch 1983:65-6). On thé
other hand the group cannot be too large. Platteau (1991:136)) refers hère
to thé incentive problem: "any kind of collective action - including social
security arrangements - is always under serious threat from incentive
Problems". These problems actually arise when information is costly and
asymmetrically distributed, and they usually take thé form of moral hazard
and adverse sélection (Newbery 1989:278-9; Binswanger and Rosenzweig
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1986:507; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:165-6).5 These problems can only be
avoided when elaborate record-keeping is possible and transaction costs
of providing insurance, including social security (administrative and
information costs) are relatively low (Platteau 1991:136). We have already
argued that administrative Systems in developing countries are usually not
well developed and organized. Platteau (1991:137) states that the problem
of asymmetrical information is one of the reasons why social security
schemes in developing countries can be found mainly at the level of small
communities and social groups. The cost of information collection and
contract enforcement is reduced, then, to manageable levels. Historical
ties and personaüzed relationships tend to allow further réductions of
information costs. Moreover, given the interlinked nature of many transac-
tions and the lack of alternative possibilities (other communities or social
groups being themselves tightly-knit social entities with entry barriers), the
cost of free-riding or rule-breaking tends to be so high that even implicit
or tacit commitments can be considered as more or less self-enforcing.
For a group to be a solidarity group in which balancing takes place
between risks and needs, the composition of the group is another condi-
tion. The composition must be such that at all times there are enough
members who can give sufficiently of their own means to members in
need. This implies a composition of the group by which not all members
are affected by the same risk at the same time (so called collective risks).
To give an example: it does not make much sensé for farmers living in an
ecologically uniform area and carrying out activities which are similar
from a risk point of view to pool or share their risks. If they are all maize
5
 In the economie theory of insurance, moral hazard arises 'when an
agent who obtains insurance bas an incentive to take less care to avoid
the contingencies which give rise to claims'. As for adverse sélection, it
occurs 'when the insurance Company cannot distinguish between agents
who have different probabilities of claims, and hence must offer all the
same contract', with the result that the contract only appeals to (and ad-
versely sélects) those belonging to a comparatively high-risk category
(Newbery 1989:278). Both problems arise from 'asymmetrie information'
regarding the relevant personal characteristics of the agent seeking
insurance.
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growers, for example, a drought or maize disease will
the same extent. No one is able then to help each other. A fondamental
theorem of the economie theory of risk and insurance deals witte tins so
called covariance of risks. The theorem is that the cost of an additional
risk dépends on its covariance with existing risks: thé cost will be higher
the stronger the degree of positive variance, whilst negatively correlated
risks will have the effect of reducing the total cost of risk hearing.
Consequently, there are potential gains from trade in risk when incomes
and contingencies are uncorrelated while, if all agents face similar risks,
risk cannot be reduced much by trading between the participants (Plat-
teau 1991:139; Newbery 1989:270-2; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:165). To
continue with the example of the farmers: the high covariance of yields
accounts hère for the difficulty of providing insurance against collective
risks, that is, risks which affect all the participants simultaneously. The
counterpart is when farmers, carrying out different activities from a risk
point of view, pool their risks; a contingency would not affect all farmers
to the same extent and enough farmers will be left to supply means of
subsistence to help the needy. In sum, when covariate risks exist social
security by interpersonal redistribution is not possible (or it is possible,
but no one will enter thé scheme). The composition of the group, given a
particular risk, is therefore important for interpersonal redistribution to
succeed as method of social security.
The durability of a solidarity group is another important condition. For ail
members it must be certain that thé group will continue to exist when thé
contingencies occur and during thé whole period in which conséquences
are felt as resuit of the contingency. Interpersonal redistribution takes
place, when it is certain that thé size and composition of a group or
Community will exist in future. Especially solidarity groups that are able to
replace departing members over time are suitable for interpersonal
redistribution as method for social security. Extended families or clans, for
example, are perfect solidarity groups from this point of view.
The former three conditions, size, composition, and durability are necess-
ary but not sufficient conditions. If we want a group to be a solidarity or
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risk group a principle must be present that obliges members to support
other members when necessary. There must be norms or values that force
members to redistribute means from those who have to those who have
not. The existence of such a "normative insurance" (Partsch 1983:67) is a
perquisite because it cannot be expected from the individual members
that they will contribute and contribute sufficiently at times that this is
needed. Customary rules, moral principles and Community norms consti-
tute, therefore, a powerful means of assuring each participant that co-
opération will ensue and the obligations created will be enforced (Plat-
teau 1991:139). When a group lasts long enough it might be argued that
the necessary redistribution of means will take place, as for the individual
contributions and receipts will balance in the long run. But such a balance
can only be expected with certainty when a far reaching équivalence
between contribution and benefit is secured, like with private insurance
(Partsch 1983:67).6 The realization of this équivalence principle is in
developing countries not possible because some important insurance-
technical assumptions are not given (homogeneous and estimable risks;
application of thé law of big numbers). Moreover, thé use of the équival-
ence principle is limited when it leads to situations that are in conflict
with other (often more important) values and norms of a group or society.
The équivalence principle would, for example, lead to lack of protection
for those who cannot contribute sufficiently. When thé objective is also to
create a social or needs balance thé équivalence principle should be
replaced or at least be strengthened by another principle, for example, thé
principle of solidarity.
In this section we argued that thé problem of a social security System is
how to redistribute means from those who hâve to those who hâve not.
6
 With private or individual insurance thé insurant pays an insurance
premium that corresponds with expected values of insurance benefits. If
thé calculated contribution is correct and thé group of insured people is
large enough, thé collected contributions must be sufficient to balance thé
losses or damages of an insured who suffered from a contingency. Also in
this case interpersonal redistribution takes place, but thé only objective is
to restore thé status quo before the risk occurred (Partsch 1983:67, note
61).
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Three methods of redistribution were discussed that can be used *as
instruments for a social security System. The extent to which thèse instru-
ments can be of use for social security Systems dépends on thé fulfilment
of certain conditions in order to let these methods of redistribution
fonction. A preliminary conclusion can be that intertemporal and
interrégional redistribution as method of social security Systems in devel-
oping countries is not likely to be found to a large extent. This lead us to
thé conclusion that, if social security Systems in developing countries are
présent, they will most likely use thé method of interpersonal redistribu-
tion, because thé conditions for this form of redistribution are relatively
easy to attain in developing countries.
42. Principles and forms of social security Systems
As said under Heading 4 the term social security System refers to ail
measures and stratégies by society that, in their entirety, contribute to thé
objectives of social security. When we want to describe thèse measures
and stratégies separately, we are talking about thé "forms" of a social
security System (Partsch 1983:70). Often thèse forms of social security
follow a certain leitmotif that détermines thé spécifie measures and tune
thé measures to each other. Such a leitmotif is often based on a more
général social value. When we analyze thèse leitmotifs we are talking
about thé "primciples" of a social security System (Partsch 1983:70).
It is clear that principles and forms differ per society, but let us illustrate
thé relationship between principles and forms with two examples.
The first example cornes from thé industrialized countries. The dominant
principle underlying western forms of social security is without doubt the
"insurance principle". In essence this principle means that an individual
who is threatened by a contingency pays contributions which will return to
the individual when thé contingency will occur (risk balancing). Crucial
for thé insurance principle is that only those people can profit who also
contributed in the past. Moreover, when this principle is applied unmod-
ified only those persons can participate that are able to raise thé contribu-
tions. This insurance principle reflects to a large extent thé fundamentals
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of the modern prestation and market society. At the same time the forms
of the social security system are highly determined, when choosing this
insurance principle. Necessary is the formation of a risk group, régulation
of the collection of contributions of the insured and the distribution over
those who were affected by a contingency. This again requires specialized
organizational skills and expert knowledge. Institutions are build then to
meet the demand for such organizations.
Different from the first example is the situation in non-industrialized
countries, especially those that have been isolated from western influences
for a long time. The main principle underlying forms of social security is
kinship. The importance and significance of kinship in non-industrialized
countries have fascinated anthropologists for decades. Many studies reveal
that economie, but also politica! and social acting in these societies were
or are determined by kinship ideology. Important here is that, as far as
economie, politica! and social acting within a given kingroup is conceraed,
these actings can be reduced to a principle of amity, which is very similar
to Sahlin's principle of genera! reciprocity.7 This principle is reflected in
the forms of social security existing in named societies. Forms of social
security, or institutions or processes that can be labelled as such, are often
based on this principle of genera! reciprocity. As at the same time the
kinship ideology détermines who is kin member and who is not, kinship
builds at the same time a solidarity group that is able to provide social
security for its members, based on the principle of amity or genera!
reciprocity.
In developing countries a high variety of forms and principles of social
security can be found.
7
 With genera! reciprocity Sahlins (1972:185-275) means transactions
by which a weak relation exists between contribution and benefîts, for
example, gifts to kin. Personal or social relationships between the actors
dominate the matériel aspects of the transaction. Although each gift
créâtes an entitlement on a contra-gift, its quantity, quality and time of
delivery is not determined in advance, and dépends on the possibilities of
the receiver and the need of the giver. In extreme cases genera! reciproc-
ity can lead to a one way move of means, for example, in case of handi-
capped people.
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In literature on social security in developing countries atterapts have s been
made to classify its different forms. The argument is that because of
increasing market pénétration and thé introduction of capitalist relations
of production new social security forms arise that are different from those
existing before the colonial period. Studies on social security Systems in
developing countries remarkably show an tendency to classify social
security forms in developing countries with help of dichotomies. The
dichotomies "modern" versus "traditional" and "formal" versus "informai"
can often be found (see, for example, Platteau 1991, several contributions
in Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988, Bossert 1985). However, as Von
Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988) indicate, some problems are connected
with the use of these dichotomies modern-traditional and formal-informal.
With the modern-traditional dichotomy is mostly indicated the différence
between state organized institutions for social security, which are relative-
ly new in developing countries, and forms of social security which func-
tion(ed) in the traditional or pre-capitalist society. In developing countries
we find many rules and principles which are of ancient origin and which
have been maintained through tradition within local communities. But the
use of the term "traditional" might imply the notion of an "unchanging
tradition" in those societies. Also traditions "discovered" during the
colonial period were influenced or even created by economie and admin-
istrative measures of colonial governments. It makes sense to describe as
"traditional", as von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988:12) suggest, those forms
of social security which are rationalized by référence to tradition, and to
distinguish them from historically more recent and innovative legal rules
and institutions, as for instance the emerging local institutions of self and
mutual help. But it must be kept in mind that these institutions are not
necessarily informal, traditional, archaic or customary. They may be
modern phenomena, the highly rational responses of people united by a
common interest in overcoming problems of need and risk through a
coopérative effort. Besides this, large parts of state law can be considered
to be traditional, too. This is especially the case with those old rules which
have been handed down through the générations within the Community of
legal scholars, judges and state bureaucrats. Von Benda-Beckmann et al.
(1988:13) suggest that we might do better to speak, with respect to any
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society, of old rules and recent innovations, of historical and contempor-
aiy legal forms, if we want to give a temporal aspect to our conceptual
usage. They conclude, that "if we use the conventional pairs of terms to
identify in a genera! way state law on the one hand, and traditional law
on the other, we are certainly embarking on a mistaken voyage füled with
false comparisons and false contradictions" (Von Benda-Beckmann et al.
1988:13).
The second dichotomy to be found in literature is formal versus informal
social security forms. As in other sphères of life (such as labour relations
and credit arrangements) "formai" tends to be equated with western-style,
state-initiated social security, and "informai" with social security provided
by family, kinship and village groups. By this équation, however, we are
almost certain to miss the informai éléments in the western, and the
formal éléments in the indigenous Systems. The actual working of western
social security often resembles very little a model of formai applications
of universal rules. Local, indigenous forms of social security, on the other
hand, can be very formal. In the local village and tribal sphères we are
dealing with sets of quite well defined légal obligations and rights, on any
reasonable view of what is "legal". Obviously, we also find informal mutual
help arrangements which transcend légal obligations. These, however,
should be opposed to the arrangements of both state and local laws. So
we can distinguish formal and informai aspects of social security forms in
different societies, but cannot classify sets of social security arrangements
(state and indigenous respectively) along the same line (Von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1988:12).
Previous remarks suggest that a classification according to dualistic lines
should be avoided. Can we think of an alternative classification? Yes, if
we can argue why we want such a classification in the first place. One
argument is that a classification can make an investigation into the
functioning of social security forms easier. As argued developing countries
show a variety of social security principles and forms, not in the last place
caused by the influence of colonial and post-colonial developments. A
"social security pluralism" (Zacher 1988:26) has developed. By classifying
these forms according to certain criteria we can group forms and analyze
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their characteristics, their mutual différences and their dynamics. More-
over, a classification can help us to set bounds to our field of study, when
we want to analyze a subsection of a given social security system.
The classification proposed in this study- is derived from a common
classification criterium in our discipline (économies), namely the level of
analysis. When we would investigate social security forms it will become
clear that they can be found at all levels of society: Community level, in
churches, at state level, within the family or within kingroups, etc. It is
mainly for analytical purposes that we want to make a classification
according to the level at which social security forms play. When is deter-
mined at which level what social security forms can be placed we can
investigate if these forms at each level follow common principles, use the
same method of redistribution, are determined by the same factors, etc.
The hypothesis is that similarities between social security forms will rather
be found between forms that fonction at the same level than between
forms that are classified according to their legal (formal or informai) or
historica! (modem or traditional) status.
The first level of analysis we can distinguish is the individual. An individ-
ual can protect him- or herself against contingencies by individual précau-
tions, for example by dissaving, selling durable items, private insurance
companies, etc. Individual précautions are not social précautions and
therefore do not fall under the social security scheme. At the individual
level no social security forms in the proper sensé of the word can be
found.
When thé individual is not able to take précautions him- or herself, thé
first level of support, and our second level of analysis, is the family. Hère
we restrict ourselves in first instance to thé nuclear family (husband, wife
and children). We will call this thé household. The household can be con-
sidered as the basic unit of survival. Contingencies will be countered first
within thé household. But when discussing thé conditions for solidarity
groups, we already questioned to what extent thé nuclear family, given her
size, will be able to provide social security to its members and can be
considered as a valid solidarity group for social security purposes. In this
study thé redistributive principles within thé household in times of contin-
gencies are not considered as social security forms. Thèse mechanisms are
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considérée! to be part of the household survival strategy.8
The third level of analysis is what we will call the level of small-scale
social relationships. At this level we can place those social security fonns
that can be found within extended families, clans, communities and
villages, among friends, neighbours, and church members, etc..
The fourth level is thé so called corporate level, under which we can
place those social security forais that are neither organized by the state
nor depend on small scale social relationships. National Provident Funds,
Company funds but also charity organizations might fall under this level.
The fifth level at which social security forms can be found is the level of
the state. State initialized and organized social security forms can be
social assistance schemes, pension schemes and sometimes médical
schemes. In literature thèse forms of social security are often headed
under "formai social security".
The sixth level is thé supra-state level or international level. It can be
questioned if international social security forms can be found, but emerg-
ency help in case of famines, floods or droughts might be labelled as such.
Interesting topic of discussion can be if regulär development aid also falls
under international social security.
4.3. Déterminants of social security Systems
What we do not know from previous sections yet is which factors déter-
mine thé spécifie structure of a social security system at a particular place
and at a particular time. We recall that thé issue at stake in social security
is that a contingency causes a détérioration in thé standard of living of
individual(s), and that thé récupération would need extra means. Solutions
were found in thé différent methods of redistribution that can be used as
instruments for reaching thé objectives of social security. From this point
of view those factors are important that, firstly, détermine thé size and
8
 Although it is stated in this paper that we only consider those forms
of collective action as social security forms that exceed thé household
level and that contribute to thé objectives of social security, we do not
deny thé importance of intra-household relationships when discussing
social security of individuals (see, for example, Agarwal 1991).
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composition of disposante means and, secondly, détermine thé conditions
for thé several methods of redistribution. Partsch (1983:72) distinguishes
three déterminants of social security Systems: thé level of économie
development, thé social structure, and values and norms of a group or
society.
The level of économie development détermines in first place thé amount
of goods, services or money available for social security purposes. If there
are just enough means to give everyone a minimum standard of living
Problems could arise for those individuals suffering from a contingency.
The problem in many developing countries is that millions of people live
below a minimum standard of living. In that case not many means are
available for social security purposes, and when social security forms exist
they often take thé form of "shared poverty": although no one bas enough
means people will help each other, as they know that in future they also
will need help one time. In the second place economie development
causes a increase in the standard of living. In turn this higher standard of
living might lead to a new définition of what should be the minimum
standard of living. More means have to be made available then, to bring
someone back on the initial standard of living before the contingency
occurred. In the third place the level of economie development also déter-
mines to a large extent which modes of redistribution can be used as
instruments for social security Systems. We saw that especially intertem-
poral and interrégional redistribution require the présence of certain
economie conditions. The introduction of money, for example, facilitated
intertemporal redistribution. Moreover, individuals became less dependent
on goods and services from kin, friends, or other interpersonal transfers as
money enabled them to contribute to a common fund from which they
could receive benefits in times of need. The introduction of money
widened the choice for a particular mode of redistribution and social
security form.
Social structure is a ambiguous term and what exactly is understood by
this term is not clear. Social structure as a général concept comprises a
multitude of empirically verifiable and relative stable features that
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characterize a society. Among others, social structure can indicate the
degree of division of labour, institutions and bureaucracy, social strata and
class formation, catégories of population according to âge, éducation or
income, etc. With regard to social security Systems social structure primar-
ily deals with the standard of living of its members. Secondly, the social
structure tells us something about thé général social relationships in
society which, in turn, shape the size and quality of social relationships
that are important for thé (re)distribution processes to take place. In thé
third place several éléments from thé social structure are important for
thé shape of social security Systems, like thé âge distribution, family
structure, production and employment structure, settlement patterns, etc.
Last but not least values and norms that regulate thé social acting of
members of society, are very important. Values symbolize thé common
view of a stratum or a group in society or thé common view of a society
as a whole on what is désirable; values influence and limit the choices
between possible acts, means and objectives. Values détermine thé social
security System to thé extent that they influence thé principle of social
security Systems that is chosen. As we already argued it is not very likely
that thé social security System of a group or society follows a principle
that contradicts général and widely acknowledged values. Moreover,
values are often used to défend a choice for a particular social security
principle. In western societies thé choice of thé insurance principle is
justified by referring to its correspondence with generally accepted values
like self-responsibility and "Leistungsgerechtigkeit" (Partsch 1983:74).9
Values, however, should be upheld irrespective of the situation we are
talking about. Values hâve an universal meaning. When we want values to
be of use for regulating social acting they hâve to be operationalized. In
sociology the term "social norms" is used for thèse operationalizations
(Partsch 1983:74). Norms are mandatory and relatively constant rules of
conduct; norms indicate exactly in a particular situation how to handle
9
 With "Leistungsgerechtigkeit" is meant thé général idea prevailing in
western societies that a person can only benefit if he or she also contrib-
uted in the past. Distribution takes place "according to work or contribu-
tion" and not "according to need".
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and what acts are prescribed or prohibited. If norms are respected in daily
life they do not only direct social acting but also bring about a certain
regularity, uniformity and répétition in the outcomes of particular social
acts. This latter characteristic of norms is important for social security
Systems as the functioning of the System dépends on régulation and
regularity. As said earlier, it cannot be expected that thé necessary
processes of (re)distribution will take place and will take place adequate-
ly, when no nonns are présent to force members of a solidarity group to
contribute.
By identifying thé three main déterminants of social security Systems, it is
possible theoretically to solve thé problem of explaining why social
security Systems differ from each other and why they change. Thèse
différences and changes can be explained because déterminants differ and
because changes take place in thèse déterminants. The analysis of the
déterminants and their changes would explain to a large extent thé
dynamics of social security Systems. The question which factors cause thé
changes of thé déterminants might lead to thé ultimate identification of
changes in social security Systems, but this would require a comprehensive
study of thé dynamics of societies. Although attempts have been made, no
such theory exists and thé analysis of thé déterminants is ail that is
possible. It should be said hère that thé déterminants are not separate
entities in a given society and are highly interdependent. A change in one
of thé déterminants will cause changes in thé other two. Because of this
interdependency Partsch (1983:76) suggests to combine thé changes of
thèse déterminants in one term when they are used to explain thé devel-
opment of social security Systems. The term Partsch uses is "social differ-
entiation", a long-lasting process of development whereby small, homo-
geneous social formations develop to larger, heterogeneous and complex
societies because of increasing division of labour, social stratification and
other structural changes. In a process of social differentiation not only thé
déterminants are changing but also the individual standards of living will
gradually differentiate. This process bas conséquences for thé social
security systeni as this will lead to plural forais of social security.
For theoretical purposes it might be useful, then, to classify societies
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according to the degree of social differentiation. Analogue to this classifi-
cation also the social security Systems will differ. Partsch (1983:78)
distinguishes less differentiated or primitive societies (archaic societies),
more differentiated or complex societies • (feudal societies) and highly
differentiated or modern industrial societies. Of course all kind of inter-
mediate forms are possible.
In this place it is important to know where to place the developing
countries. Partsch (1983:78) concludes on the one hand that the so-called
developing countries cannot be considered as modern industrial societies
and on the other hand did not arose because of a autonomous process of
social differentiation but from contacts with other civilizations.
Evidently, developing countries also have their own dynamics. One
différence with industrialized countries, however, is that the own internai
dynamic of pre-capitalist societies was highly disturbed and sometimes
destroyed by the intrusion of capitalist éléments and forces. The pre-
capitalist social formations changed structurally as a result of western
expansion in these societies.
Six fundamental processes of change have been taking place in the pre-
capitalist societies: the introduction of a money economy, the introduction
of private ownership of land and of commercial monocultures, migrations
of workers and the flight from the land, urbanization, industrialization,
and national intégration.
The introduction of money. or the intensification of its use, was an
important change. The development of a money economy was bound up
with the conversion of traditional taxes from kind into money, with the
growth of trade and the replacement of barter by money exchange, and
lastly with the organization and expansion of wage-earning labour in
accordance with the requirements of the government and the colonial
economy.
The development of capitalism also gave rise to the individual appropri-
ation of land. The indigenous population was often expropriated and the
land was divided amongst a privileged group of people. In Latin America
this process starled earlier than in Africa or Asia.
The development of new economie activities (like mining and other
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industries) and new organisation forais of agriculture (like plantations)
increased thé need for wage-labourers, entailing significant migratory
flows of workers. Thèse migrations can be of a temporary or of a more
permanent character. The latter induces a one-way traffic from thé
countryside to thé towns.
Urbanization bas become a very important phenomenon in récent years.
Towns and cities have been created to fulfil fonctions of an administra-
tive, military, commercial or other nature.
Industrialisation bas taken a spécifie form bound up with Western devel-
opment. It is usually confined to industries exploiting natural resources
and providing raw materials for export, or light manufacturing industries
exporting mainly to western countries.
Finally, there is thé émergence of nationhood, which bas its roots in
European expansion. But this national intégration process if far from
complète: there are still marked ethnie and régional différences in Latin
America, Asia and Africa.
The above six structural processes hâve transformed pre-capitalist
societies with regard to their activities (industries and plantations, new
agricultural technologies), their way of life (urbanization, population
movements, money economy), their social structure (development of
private ownership, appearance of new production relations) and, lastly,
their socio-political organization (process of colonization followed by
national intégration), social psychology and culture (Malassis 1975:60-1).
The resuit of thèse structural changes is what we tend to call developing
countries. Pre-capitalist societies have been fundamentalry transformed
and depending on the country or région concerned thèse pre-capitalist
societies may largely have been destroyed or a dualistic structure bas
emerged where pre-capitalist and capitalist éléments exist alongside each
other.
It will be clear to the reader that thèse structural changes in thé économie
and social structure, and in thé norms and values largely influence social
security forais in developing countries. The questions how and to what
extent social security forms are influenced by thèse structural changes are
beyond the scope of this paper, but it must be clear that insight in thèse
structural processes is necessary in order to understand thé development
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of and changes in social security forms in developing countries.
!
5. SUMMARY
In this paper we discussed some basic issues with regard to social security
and social security Systems. In thé fîrst section we defîned social security
in such a way that also social security in developing countries can be
analyzed. In thé second section we justified our choice for a wider défini-
tion by explaining thé universal necessity of social security. The actual
efforts by a given society to reach thé objectives of social security hâve
been defined in the third section as a social security System. We discussed
three modes of redistribution that can be used as method underlying
social security Systems. We discussed also the conditions under which
thèse modes of redistribution can operate. Then we defined briefly thé
!
 terms "principles" and "forms" of social security Systems, discussed two
classification methods for social security forms, and introduced a third
classification. In thé last subsection thé main déterminants of social
security Systems were analyzed and six major socio-économie develop-
( ments were indicated that take place in developing countries.
t
M
!j It is thought that thé concepts and ideas presented in this paper may
contribute to thé construction of an analytical framework of social security
I which is less biased to western social security Systems and, consequently,
enables thé study of social security in developing countries to be donc in a
wider perspective than many studies have done until sofar.
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